The Reverse Talmud rule for bankruptcy problems applies the Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA rule) for 'large' amounts of the estate, while it applies the Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL rule) for 'small' amounts of the estate. The CEA rule, respectively CEL rule, can be axiomatized using the Exemption and Exclusion properties respectively. There is no rule that satisfies both these two properties. In this paper we axiomatize the Reverse Talmud rule by using compatible weaker versions of the Exemption and Exclusion properties.
Introduction
A rationing or bankruptcy problem describes a situation in which a given amount of a divisible commodity, the estate, has to be distributed among a group of agents, each having an exogenously given nonnegative claim such that the sum of all claims is at least equal to the estate. A typical example is the bankruptcy of a firm, but there are many other situations, e.g. the execution of a will with insufficient assets (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) , shortages of medical supplies (Moulin, 2003) or the regulation of fishery within the European Union where the total allowable catch exceeds the (historical) rights of the countries (Gallastegui, Iñarra and Prelezzo, 2002 ). An opposite, but mathematically equivalent problem is the cost sharing problem, where the cost of some joint project has to be covered by contributions of agents and there is some maximum contribution (tax) that can be levied on the agents. Here the costs can be considered as the estate and the maximum tax as the claim.
A bankruptcy rule is a solution that assigns a distribution of the estate over the agents such that every agent receives a nonnegative part of the estate and no agent gets more than his claim. There is an extensive literature on bankruptcy rules, see e.g., Young (1987 Young ( , 1988 , Chun (1988 Chun ( , 1999 , Dagan (1996) , Herrero et al. (1999) , Herrero and Villar (2001) and Thomson (2007 Thomson ( , 2008 . See also e.g. O'Neill (1982) , Aumann and Maschler (1985) , Curiel et al. (1988) , and Dagan and Volij (1993) for a game theoretic approach. For a survey, we refer to Moulin (2001) and Thomson (2003) . Aumann and Maschler (1985) is one of the fundamental articles in the game theoretic analysis of bankruptcy problems, showing that the distribution proposed in several allocation problems in the Talmud are consistent with the nucleolus of an associated cooperative TU-game. This solution, called the Talmud rule, combines two well-known rules in bankruptcy problems, namely the Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA rule) and the Constrained Equal Losses rule (CEL rule). The CEA rule divides the estate equally among the agents under the condition that nobody gets more than his claim, whereas the CEL rule divides the total loss (being the difference between the aggregate claim and the estate) equally among the agents, provided that no agent ends up with a negative outcome. Herrero and Villar (2001) axiomatize the CEA and CEL rule using the axioms of Exemption, respectively, Exclusion. The Exemption property expresses that small claims are not held responsible for the shortages. In contrast, Exclusion ignores small claims. The specific conditions under which an agent receives his full claim, respectively nothing, are inconsistent in the sense that there is no bankruptcy rule that satisfies both the Exemption and the Exclusion property. However, both principles of Exclusion and Exemption can be respected when stating more severe conditions under which an agent must receive his claim, respectively nothing. Lowering the boundaries of what is considered to be a 'small claim', in this paper we require less demanding versions of the Exemption and Exclusion properties that are compatible. In particular, we show that these weak versions of the two properties are satisfied by the Reverse Talmud rule, introduced in Chun, Schummer and Thomson (2001) , see also Thomson (2008) , and use them in characterizing this rule. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section on bankruptcy rules and in Section 3 we introduce and discuss axioms for bankruptcy rules. In Section 4 the Reverse Talmud rule characterized by using weak versions of the Exemption and Exclusion axioms that are compatible.
Bankruptcy rules
A bankruptcy problem is a triple (N, E, c) where N ⊂ IN is a finite set of at least two agents, E ≥ 0 is an amount of some divisible commodity (e.g. money), referred to as the estate and c ∈ IR N is a vector 1 of nonnegative claims c i , i ∈ N , such that i∈N c i ≥ E.
For given N , the collection of all bankruptcy problems (N, E, c) is denoted by B N , and
N denotes the collection of all bankruptcy problems over all populations. An allocation x ∈ IR N assigns a payoff x i to every i ∈ N . For S ⊆ N and a vector y ∈ IR N , we denote y S = (x i ) i∈S and y(S) = i∈S x i . We further denote the aggregate claim by C = i∈N c i and the aggregate loss by
N is a bankruptcy problem in which the aggregate loss L has to be distributed among the agents. A bankruptcy rule on B is a mapping F that assigns to every (N, E, c) ∈ B a unique allocation F (N, E, c) ∈ IR N that is efficient and individually non-negative and claim bounded, i.e., (i) i∈N F i (N, E, c) = E, and
Notice that this implies that F i (N, 0, c) = 0 and F (N, C, c) = c, where 0 ∈ IR N is the vector with all components zero. For given bankruptcy rule F , the dual rule F * of F (see Aumann and Maschler (1985) ) is obtained by giving every agent his claim and then distributing the aggregate loss L = C − E among the agents according to F , i.e., F that have been discussed extensively in the literature. The Constrained Equal Awards rule CEA assigns to every (N, E, c) ∈ B the allocation
where λ * is the solution to i∈N min[c i , λ] = E. The Constrained Equal Losses rule CEL assigns to every (N, E, c) ∈ B the allocation
It is well known (see e.g. Moulin (2001) or Herrero and Villar (2001) ) and straightforward to verify that the CEA and CEL rules are each other's dual: CEA * = CEL and CEL * = CEA. Finally, the Talmud rule T uses the CEA rule when the estate is 'small' and the CEL rule when the estate is 'large'. It assigns for every (N, E, c) ∈ B to each i ∈ N payoff
The Talmud rule belongs to the class of ICI rules, see Thomson (2008) . According to an ICI rule the payoff of an individual agent first Increases in E, then is Constant if E increases further, and above a certain level Increases in E again. According to the Talmud rule, for low values of E all agents get an equal share in the estate. When E increases, the agents are in order of increasing claims excluded successively from any further increment of the estate until only the agent with the biggest claim is left and receives on its own any further increment of the estate. However, when the estate increases further beyond some big enough value, all agents return successively in order of decreasing claims and for values of E close to C all agents have returned to share in the estate. At any level of E each increment of the estate is shared equally among the agents that are present at that level.
In this paper we consider the Reverse Talmud rule RT. This rule has been introduced in Chun, Schummer and Thomson (2001) as a counterpart of the Talmud rule. This RT rule uses the CEL rule when the estate is small and the CEA rule when the estate is large. It assigns for every (N, E, c) ∈ B to each i ∈ N payoff
When the estate is at most half of the aggregate claim then each agent receives an amount according to the CEL rule with half of the claims. When the estate is at least half of the aggregate claim, then first all agents receive half of their claim, which is subtracted from the estate, and the remainder of the estate is distributed according to the CEA rule with half of the claims. In contrast to the Talmud rule, the RT-rule belongs to the class of CIC rules, being rules such that the payoff of an agent is Constant for small E, then Increases in E, and finally is constant in E, again see Thomson (2008) . According to the RT rule, 2 Because CEA and CEL are each other's dual, the two expressions in the formula are equal when
Reverse Talmud for very low values of the estate the full estate goes to the agent with the biggest claim.
When the estate increases all agents enter successively in order of decreasing claims until they all share equally any further increment of the estate. An agent is leaving as soon as its claim is fully assigned, this happens in order of increasing claims. As a motivation for the RT-rule, in the next example we compare the Talmud and Reverse Talmud rules with each other.
Example 2.1 Table 1 shows the payoffs according to the Talmud and RT rules for the well-known three-agent Talmudic bankruptcy example with claims 100, 200 and 300, for estates varying from 100 to 500. The table shows that (as known) the Talmud rule equally distributes the estate among the agents when the estate is small and equally distributes the losses when the estate is large. On the contrary, the Reverse Talmud rule does not assign anything to the agents with the smallest claim when the estate is small, but assigns to such an agent its full claim when the estate is large. 2
The Talmud rule is widely known in the literature as one of the basic rules for bankruptcy problems and was indeed already recommended in the 2000-year old Babylonian Talmud, see Aumann and Maschler (1985) . However, the RT rule seems to be an appropriate device for cost sharing or taxation problems. When the costs E are small, the RT rule only charges (rich) agents i with high tax capacity c i . When E increases also agents with smaller tax capacities have to contribute and for large costs E the 'small' agents are charged up to their full capacity c i , while 'big' agents pay more, but their high capacity c i is not yet fully taxed away. But also when some person goes bankrupt the RT rule might be a good alternative. In some sense it reflects the Talmudic principle that in general a lender automatically has a lien on the property of the borrower, but this principle does not hold when the property is less than half of the loan, see Aumann and Maschler (1985, p204) . The explanation is that in the latter case the lien does not help very much anyway and the loan was presumably made on 'trust' instead of based on a guarantee by the worth of the property. The Reverse Talmud rule reflects this principle for small loans: small loans are totally lost when the estate is small compared to the aggregate claim (the loan is given in trust), but small loans are fully paid (above bigger loans) when the estate is high relative to the aggregate claim (a small lender has automatically a lien on the property when its value is high).
Axioms for bankruptcy problems
In the literature several axiomatic characterizations of the Proportional, CEA, CEL and Talmud rule can be found. Three well-known axioms are:
Consistency: For every S ⊂ N and i ∈ S it holds that
, where
Self-Duality: For every (N, E, c) ∈ B it holds that F (N, E, c) = F * (N, E, c).
Supermodularity says that when the estate becomes larger, the increase in the payoffs of the agents is nondecreasing in the size of the claims: an agent with a bigger claim receives at least the same of the additional amount of the estate as an agent with a smaller claim. Consistency relates for every subset S of N the payoffs of the agents in S in the bankruptcy problem (N, E, c) to their payoffs in the induced bankruptcy problem (S, E S , c S ) on the set S, where the modified estate is the total payoff of the agents in S in the original problem. A bankruptcy rule is Self-Dual if to every bankruptcy problem it assigns the same allocation as its dual solution. The CEA, CEL, Talmud and Reverse Talmud rules all satisfy Supermodularity and Consistency. Both the Talmud rule and Reverse Talmud rule are self-dual: T * = T and RT * = RT . The CEA and CEL rules are each other's dual:
In this paper we are, in particular, interested in the so-called Exemption and Exclusion properties introduced by Herrero and Villar (2001) . The Exemption property states that an agent whose claim is at most equal to the average estate (i.e., the estate divided by the number of agents) earns his claim. On the other hand, the Exclusion property states that an agent whose claim is at most equal to the average aggregate loss (i.e., the aggregate loss divided by the number of agents) earns nothing. In the following, let n = |N | denote the cardinality of N .
The Exemption and Exclusion properties somehow express the Talmudic principle that in general a lender automatically has a lien on the property of the borrower, but this principle does not hold when the property is less than half of the loan: Exemption says that small claims are not held responsible for the shortages, while Exclusion ignores small claims. The CEA rule satisfies Exemption and the CEL rule satisfies Exclusion, but there is no bankruptcy rule F that satisfies both properties simultaneously.
3 However, this is not due to the principles of Exemption and Exclusion itself, but is caused by what is considered to be a 'small' claim in relation to the size of the estate. By strengthening the definition of what is considered to be a small claim, we define weaker versions of the Exemption and the Exclusion properties:
Notice that Weak Exemption only applies when E ≥ L, and thus 2E ≥ C, and Weak Exclusion only applies when 2E ≤ C. Weak Exemption states that small claims are fully awarded when the estate is large (2E ≥ L), where we consider a claim small in relation to the estate if the claim is not more than the difference between the average estate and the average aggregate loss (instead of the average estate as in Exemption). On the contrary, Weak Exclusion states that claims are ignored when the estate is small (2E ≤ C), where a claim is small if it is not more than the difference between the average of the aggregate loss and the average estate and the estate. Obviously, the requirement under which an agent 'must' receive his claim is stronger than that of Exemption. With Exemption an agent i is already guaranteed his claim c i when this claim is not more than the average estate. One could say that in that case agent i is not responsible for the deficit since there would be no deficit if all agents have the same claim c i . However, there can be good reasons why other agents have higher claims in which case there is no reason why agent i should get his claim c i . Even though there would be no deficit if all agents have claim c i , it is a strong statement that agent i is not responsible for the deficit in that case.
The condition under which Weak Exemption requires that an agent must receive its claim seems more reasonable. Since Weak Exemption only applies when 2E ≥ C and thus the aggregate loss L = C − E is not more than the estate E, we can assign already an amount equal to the aggregate loss C − E over the agents, so that after that there 3 When, for instance, C = 2E we have L = C − E = E and for c i ≤ 1 n E = 1 n L the two principles require simultaneously that F i (N, E, c) = c i and F i (N, E, c) = 0, which is contradictory.
is still a nonnegative amount left over. Suppose that for some agent i with claim c i not more than the average of E − L, the amount C − E is first allocated amongst the other agents in N \ {i}. Then c i is still not more than the average of the remaining estate E − (C − E) = E − L and Weak Exemption states that agent i can not be held responsible for the deficit and should be awarded his full claim.
Similarly, Weak Exclusion only applies when 2E ≤ C and thus when the aggregate loss L = C −E is bigger than the estate E. Then we can already substract an amount equal to the estate E from the total claim, and after that there is still a remaining loss. Suppose we subtract this amount E from the total claim in a way such that noting is taken from the claim of agent i. If after subtracting the full estate from the claims of other agents, the claim c i of agent i is still not more than the average of the remaining loss L − E, then Weak Exclusion states that this claim c i is so small that it should be ignored.
Axiomatization of the Reverse Talmud rule
In this section we characterize the Reverse Talmud rule by using Weak Exemption and Weak Exclusion. We first show that the Reverse Talmud rule satisfies Weak Exemption and Supermodularity and then give a characterization with Weak Exemption. The Reverse Talmud rule also satisfies Supermodularity.
Lemma 4.2 The Reverse Talmud rule on B satisfies Supermodularity.
Proof. It is known that the CEA and CEL rules satisfy Supermodularity. We now consider three cases for the RT rule. For two agents i and j, suppose that c i ≥ c j and consider E and E with E > E. When E is smaller than half of the aggregate claim C, then it follows from the Supermodularity of the CEL rule that agent i faces at least the same additional payoff as agent j when the estate increases from E to E . Similarly, when E is larger than half of the aggregate claim, then Supermodularity of the CEA rule implies that agent i faces at least the same additional payoff as agent j when the estate increases from E to E . Finally, when E is at most half of the aggregate claim and E is at least half of the aggregate claim, then, first, agent i faces at least the same additional payoff as agent j when the estate increases from E to 1 2 C by Supermodularity of the CEL rule, and, second, agent i faces at least the same additional payoff as agent j when the estate increases from 1 2
C to E by Supermodularity of the CEA rule.
2
We now come to the main theorem which characterizes the RT rule.
Theorem 4.3 The Reverse Talmud rule is the unique bankruptcy rule on B that satisfies Weak Exemption, Self-Duality, Supermodularity and Consistency.
Proof. From the Lemma's 4.1 and 4.2 we have that the RT rule satisfies Weak Exemption and Supermodularity. Self-Duality and Consistency are shown in Thomson (2008) . It remains to show that the four properties uniquely determine the outcome. Let N ⊂ IN. Without loss of generality we take N = {1, . . . , n} and assume that
n denote the vector of payoffs assigned by the RT rule. For n = 1, by definition every rule assigns E fully to the single agent in N , thus x 1 = E. Next we consider n = 2. Define
Notice that E 0 ≥ 0 and
We distinguish three cases. First consider the case that E ≥ E 1 . This yields
Hence Weak Exemption implies that x 1 = c 1 , x 2 = E −c 1 and thus the payoffs are uniquely determined. The second case is E ≤ E 0 . This yields c 1 ≤ c 2 − 2E and thus
By Self-Duality and the first case (E ≥ E 1 ) above, we immediately obtain that x 1 = 0, x 2 = E and again the payoffs are uniquely determined. It remains to consider the case E 0 ≤ E ≤ E 1 . We have seen that x c 2 . So, when E goes from E 0 to E 1 , the increase in both payoffs is equal to c 1 . Supermodularity now requires that for any E between E 0 and E 1 ,
(E − E 0 ). Hence for any E the payoffs are uniquely determined when n = 2. For n ≥ 2, we now proceed by induction. 4 Suppose that the payoffs are uniquely determined when the number of agents is at most n − 1. Define
We distinguish three similar cases as for n = 2. First consider the case that E ≥ E 1 . This yields nc 1 ≤ 2E −C = E −L and Weak Exemption implies that x 1 = c 1 and so n i=2 F i (N, E, c) = E −c 1 . Then x 2 , . . . , x n are uniquely determined by Consistency 4 Instead of this last part of the proof we can alternatively prove that the Reverse Talmud rule is conversely consistent if n = 2, and apply Thomson's (2000) Elevator Lemma, saying that whenever a consistent rule F coincides with a conversely consistent rule F for n = 2, it must be true that F = F for any n ≥ 2. and the induction hypothesis (i.e., the four properties uniquely determine the payoffs when the number of agents is equal to n − 1.). Hence the payoffs are uniquely determined. The second case is
. This yields nc 1 ≤ C − 2E = L − E. By Self-Duality and the first case we obtain x 1 = 0, and so n i=2 F i (N, E, c) = E. Again x 2 , . . . , x n follow from Consistency and the induction hypothesis. It remains to consider the case E 0 ≤ E ≤ E 1 .
Let x 0 ∈ IR n be the uniquely determined vector of payoffs at E 0 and x 1 ∈ IR n at E 1 . It holds that x 0 1 = 0 and x 1 1 = c 1 . Further E 1 − E 0 = nc 1 . So, when E goes from E 0 to E 1 , the total payoff increases with nc 1 , whereas the payoff of the smallest claim agent increases from 0 to c 1 . Supermodularity now requires that the change in payoff for all agents should be the same, and thus for any E between E 0 and E 1 ,
Hence for any E the payoffs are uniquely determined. 2
The next examples show that the four axioms in the theorem are logically independent.
Example 4.4 1. The Talmud rule satisfies Self-Duality, Supermodularity and Consistency, but does not satisfy Weak Exemption. 2. The CEA rule satisfies Weak Exemption, Supermodularity and Consistency, but is not Self-Dual. 3. For i ∈ N , denote A i = {j|c j >c i } c j and B i = {j|c j <c i } c j . Then the rule F given by
satisfies Weak Exemption, Self-Duality and Consistency, but is not Supermodular. 4. For (N, E, c) with N = {1, 2, 3} and c = (2, 4, 6) consider the bankruptcy rule G given by 2, 4, 6) , and F (N, E, c) = RT (N, E, c) otherwise, satisfies Weak Exemption, Self-Duality and Supermodularity, but not Consistency. 2
Although Exemption and Self-Duality are incompatible, Theorem 4.3 shows that Weak Exemption and Self-Duality are compatible and are both satisfied by the RT solution. Moreover, it is straightforward that a bankruptcy rule that satisfies Self-Duality and Weak Exemption must satisfy Weak Exclusion. This gives the following lemma (the straightforward proof is omitted).
Lemma 4.5 Consider a bankruptcy rule F that satisfies Self-Duality. Then F satisfies Weak Exemption if and only if it satisfies Weak Exclusion.
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.5 imply that the Reverse Talmud rule satisfies Weak Exclusion. From the definition of Weak Exemption and Weak Exclusion it also follows that both the CEA and the CEL rule satisfy precisely one of the two, while the Talmud rule does not satisfy any of the two.
5 Further it is obvious from the proof of Theorem 4.3 that, together with Supermodularity and Consistency, the Reverse Talmud rule is characterized by any two of the three properties of Self-Duality, Weak Exemption or Weak Exclusion. This gives the following corollary.
Corollary 4.6 1. The Reverse Talmud rule is the unique bankruptcy rule on B that satisfies Weak Exclusion, Self-Duality, Supermodularity and Consistency. This class of bankruptcy rules, which we call the Reverse TAL family, contains the CEA rule (for α = 0), the CEL rule (for α = 1) as extreme cases, and the RT rule (for α = It is straightforward to verify that a bankruptcy rule F satisfies α-Exemption if and only if its dual rule F * satisfies α-Exclusion. Further, every rule RT α , α ∈ [0, 1], is characterized in a similar way as the RT rule by (1 − α)-Exemption, α-Exclusion, Supermodularity and Consistency, the proof goes along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 4.3 and is therefore omitted.
